The fox has ruled the roost in academic and literary philosophy for many decades, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition.2 Hedgehogs seem naïve or charlatans, perhaps even dangerous.
Equality.
No government is legitimate unless it subscribes to two reigning principles.
First, it must show equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion.
Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life.
The question of distributive justice therefore calls for a solution to simultaneous equations. We must try to find a solution that respects both the reigning principles of equal concern and personal responsibility, and we must try to do this in a way that compromises neither principle but rather finds attractive conceptions of each that fully satisfy both.
Liberty.
Justice requires a theory of liberty as well as a theory of resource equality, and we must be aware, in constructing that theory, of the danger that liberty and equality will conflict. It was Isaiah Berlin’s claim that such conflict is inevitable.
I distinguish your freedom, which is simply your ability to do anything you might want to do without government constraint, from your liberty, which is that part of your freedom that government would do wrong to constrain.
You cannot determine what liberty requires without also deciding what distribution of property and opportunity shows equal concern for all.
Democracy.
This is the conflict between equality and liberty, on the one hand, and the right to participate as an equal in one’s own governance, on the other. Political theorists sometimes call the latter a right to positive liberty and suppose that that right may conflict with negative liberty—the rights to freedom from government I just described—and also with the right to a just distribution of resources.
Law.
Political philosophers insist on yet another conflict among political values: the conflict between justice and law. Nothing guarantees that our laws will be just; when they are unjust, officials and citizens may be required, by the rule of law, to compromise what justice requires.
**law is a branch of political morality, which is itself a branch of a more general personal morality, which is in turn a branch of a yet more general theory of what it is to live well.
I would then be achieving unity on the cheap: a meaningless victory.
Interpretation
We must ask: When do people share a concept so that their agreements and disagreements are genuine?
flaccidly : not firm
retrieve : To get and bring back
Truth and value
But they are even more plainly wrong about politics: it is our politics, more than any other aspect of our lives, that denies us the luxury of skepticism about value.
Politics is coercive: we cannot stand up to our responsibility as governors or citizens unless we suppose that the moral and other principles on which we act or vote are objectively true.
We cannot defend a theory of justice without also defending, as part of the same enterprise, a theory of moral objectivity. It is irresponsible to try to do without such a theory.
They urge a colonial philosophy: setting up embassies and garrisons of science within value discourse to govern it properly.
Value judgments are true, when they are true, not in virtue of any matching but in view of the substantive case that can be made for them. The moral realm is the realm of argument, not brute, raw fact.
Responsibility
epistemology : The thory of knowledegy
What is good and bad thinking is itself a moral question, of course: a moral epistemology is part of substantive moral theory.
Thus was born the Gibraltar of all mental blocks: that something other than value must underwrite value if we are to take value seriously.
God’s beneficent will but in some natural disposition of human beings to sympathize with one another’s suffering, for instance, or in the convenience to us of the conventional arrangements of property and security that we have contrived, then the best explanation of these beliefs contributes nothing to their justification.
On the contrary: the disconnection between the cause of our ethical and moral beliefs and any justification of those beliefs is in itself grounds for suspicion that these beliefs are not actually true, or at least that we have no reason to think them true.
Hume’s principle (as I shall call that general claim) is often taken to have a stark skeptical consequence, because it suggests that we cannot discover, through the only modes of knowledge available to us, whether any of our ethical or moral convictions is true.
Hume’s principle, properly understood, supports not skepticism about moral truth but rather the independence of morality as a separate department of knowledge with its own standards of inquiry and justification.
Morality, this tradition insisted, means a subordination of self-interest; it requires taking up a distinct objective perspective that counts the agent’s own interests as in no way more important than anyone else’s. That is the morality of self-abnegation, a morality that spawned the moral philosophy of impersonal consequentialism, of which the theories of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick are famous examples.
A person can achieve the dignity and self-respect that are indispensable to a successful life only if he shows respect for humanity itself in all its forms.
Truth in Morals
An ethical judgment makes a claim about what people should do to live well: what they should aim to be and achieve in their own lives. A moral judgment makes a claim about how people must treat other people.
I reject the idea of an external, meta-ethical inspection of moral truth. I insist that any sensible moral skepticism must be internal to morality.
external skepticism, which claims to argue from entirely nonmoral assumptions, and skepticism that is internal to morality because it does not.
<The Ordinary View>
___WORD___
feigning :
feign /feɪn /
▸ verb [with object] pretend to be affected by (a feeling, state, or injury):
she feigned nervousness.
▪ archaic invent (a story or excuse).
– ORIGIN Middle English : from Old French feign-, stem of feindre, from Latin fingere ‘mould, contrive’. Senses in Middle English (taken from Latin) included ‘make something’, ‘invent a story, excuse, or allegation’, hence ‘make a pretence of a feeling or response’. Compare with fiction and figment.
insincere :
insincere /ɪnsɪnˈsɪə /
▸ adjective not expressing genuine feelings:
she flashed him an insincere smile.
– DERIVATIVES
insincerely /ɪnsɪnˈsɪəli / adverb
– ORIGIN mid 17th century : from Latin insincerus, from in- ‘not’ + sincerus ‘sincere’.
venting :
vent1 /vɛnt /
▸ noun
1 an opening that allows air, gas, or liquid to pass out of or into a confined space:
remove any debris blocking the vents.
▪ the opening of a volcano, through which lava and other materials are emitted:
pumice fragments pile up to form a conical heap round the vent.
▪ chiefly Scottish a flue of a chimney.
▪ historical the touch hole of a gun.
▪ the anus, especially one in a lower animal such as a fish that serves for both excretion and reproduction.
2 [mass noun] the release or expression of a strong emotion, energy, etc.:
children give vent to their anger in various ways.
▸ verb [with object]
1 give free expression to (a strong emotion):
we vent our spleen on drug barons.
2 provide with an outlet for air, gas, or liquid:
tumble-dryers must be vented to the outside.
▪ discharge or expel (air, gas, or liquid) through an outlet:
the plant was isolated and the gas vented.
▪ permit air to enter (a beer cask):
once the beer has been vented, the cask must be sold within three or four days.
– DERIVATIVES
ventless adjective
– ORIGIN late Middle English : partly from French vent ‘wind’, from Latin ventus, reinforced by French évent, from éventer ‘expose to air’, based on Latin ventus ‘wind’.
spleen :
spleen /spliːn /
▸ noun
1 Anatomy an abdominal organ involved in the production and removal of blood cells in most vertebrates and forming part of the immune system.
2 [mass noun] bad temper; spite:
he could vent his spleen on the institutions which had duped him.
– DERIVATIVES
spleenful /ˈspliːnfʊl / adjective
– ORIGIN Middle English : shortening of Old French esplen, via Latin from Greek splēn; spleen (SENSE 2) derives from the earlier belief that the spleen was the seat of bad temper.
torture :
torture /ˈtɔːtʃə /
▸ noun [mass noun] the action or practice of inflicting severe pain on someone as a punishment or in order to force them to do or say something:
the torture of political prisoners
confessions extracted under torture
[as modifier] a torture chamber.
▪ great physical or mental suffering:
the torture I’ve gone through because of loving you so.
▪ a cause of great physical or mental suffering:
dances were absolute torture because I was so small.
▸ verb [with object] inflict severe pain on:
most of the victims had been brutally tortured.
▪ cause great mental suffering to:
he was tortured by grief.
– DERIVATIVES
torturable adjective
– ORIGIN late Middle English (in the sense ‘distortion, twisting’, or a physical disorder characterized by this): via French from late Latin tortura ‘twisting, torment’, from Latin torquere ‘to twist’.
Is God the author of all morality?
Can something be wrong even if everyone thinks it right?
Is morality relative to place and time?
Can something be right in one country or circumstance but wrong in another?
지금 생각해도 좋은 질문들인것 같다.
WORRIES
It is hard to imagine any distinct state of the world for which your case can be said to be evidence.
In the balance of this chapter I distinguish different versions of philosophical skepticism about morality; in the rest of Part One we concentrate on arguments for each of those versions.
<TWO IMPORTANT DISTINTIONS>
Moral reflection of that kind takes account of ordinary nonmoral facts as well, of course: facts about the impact of divorce on children’s welfare, for instance.
Philosophers use a different vocabulary to make the same distinction: they distinguish between “first-order” or “substantive” questions within a system of ideas and “second-order” or “meta” questions about that system of ideas.
생각의 발전의 순서가
first order -> second order로 간다.
Internal skepticism about morality is a first-order, substantive moral judgment.
It appeals to more abstract judgments about morality in order to deny that certain more concrete or applied judgments are true.
External skepticism, on the contrary, purports to rely entirely on second-order, external statements about morality.
So, as the metaphor suggests, internal skepticism stands within first-order, substantive morality while external skepticism is supposedly Archimedean: it stands above morality and judges it from outside.
Internal skeptics cannot be skeptical about morality all the way down, because they must assume the truth of some very general moral claim in order to establish their skepticism about other moral claims. They rely on morality to denigrate morality.
External skeptics do claim to be skeptical about morality all the way down. They are able to denigrate moral truth, they say, without relying on it.
하하.. 무슨 뜻인지 하나도 모르겠다
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